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Abstract A Service Level Agreement (SLA) represents an agreement between a service
user and a provider in the context of a particular service provision. SLAs contain
Quality of Service properties that must be maintained by a provider. These are
generally defined as a set of Service Level Objectives (SLOs). These properties
need to be measurable and must be monitored during the provision of the service
that has been agreed in the SLA. The SLA must also contain a set of penalty
clauses specifying what happens when service providers fail to deliver the pre-
agreed quality. Although significant work exists on how SLOs may be specified
and monitored, not much work has focused on actually identifying how SLOs
may be impacted by the choice of specific penalty clauses. The participation of a
trusted mediator may be necessary to resolve conflicts between involved parties.
The main focus of the paper is on identifying particular penalty clauses that can
be associated with an SLA.
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1. Introduction
A Service Level Agreement (SLA) represents an agreement between a client
and a provider in the context of a particular service provision. SLAs may
be between two parties, for instance, a single client and a single provider, or
between multiple parties, for example, a single client and multiple providers.
SLAs generally specify performance related properties, generally referred to
as Quality of Service (QoS) terms, that must be maintained by a provider dur-
ing service provision. These properties need to be measurable and must be
monitored during the provision of the service that has been agreed in the SLA
– and are referred to as Service Level Objectives (SLOs). The SLA must also
contain a set of penalty clauses when service providers fail to deliver the pre-
agreed quality. Although significant work exists on how SLOs may be spec-
ified and monitored [10], not much work has focused on actually identifying
how SLOs may be impacted by the choice of specific penalty clauses. The par-
ticipation of a trusted mediator may be necessary to resolve conflicts between
involved parties. Automating this conflict resolution process clearly provides
substantial benefits. Different outcomes are possible. These include monetary
penalties, impact on potential future agreements between the parties and the
enforced re-running of the agreed service. While it may seem reasonable to
penalise SLA non-compliance, there are a number of concerns when issuing
such penalties. For example, consider a service provider violation in a multi-
provider SLA: determining whether the service provider is the only party that
should be penalised, or determining the type of penalty that are applied to each
party would be required. Enforcement in the various legal systems of differ-
ent countries can be tackled through stipulating a ‘choice of law clause’, that
is, a clause indicating expressly which countries’ laws will be applied in case
a conflict between the provider and the client would occur. Specific ‘legal
templates’ [4] can be used to further refine such clauses. This paper focuses
on identifying particular penalty clauses that can be associated with an SLA
and on identifying how penalty clauses impact the choice of SLOs. The next
section discusses the types of violations that can be used in SLAs. Section 3
discusses the type of penalties that can be used. An example from resource
sharing in an electronic market (based on work in the CATNETs project [8])
is presented in Section 4 and a mapping to the WS-Agreement specification is
proposed in Section 5. The paper ends with discussions and conclusions.
2. Types of Violations
An SLA can go through a number of stages once it has been specified. As-
suming that the SLA is initiated by a client application, these stages include:
discovering providers; defining the SLA; agreeing on the terms of the SLA (in
addition to the penalties if the SLOs are not met); monitoring SLA violations;
terminating an SLA; enforcement of penalties for SLA violation. Monitoring
plays an important role in determining whether an SLA has been violated, and
determining the particular penalty clause that should be invoked as a conse-
quence.
Monitoring SLA violations begins once an SLA has been defined. A copy
of the SLA must be maintained by both the client and the provider. It is nec-
essary to distinguish between an ‘agreement date’ (forming of an SLA) and an
‘effective date’ (subsequently providing a service based on the SLOs that have
been agreed). For instance, a request to invoke a service based on the SLOs
may be undertaken at a time much later than when the SLOs were agreed.
During provision it is necessary to determine whether the terms agreed in the
SLA have been complied with during provision. In this context, a monitoring
infrastructure is used to identify the difference between the agreed upon SLO
and the value that was actually delivered during service provisioning – which
is ‘trusted’ by both the client and the provider.
From a legal perspective, monitoring is a prerequisite for contract enforce-
ment. In the present context, the consequences of breaching the agreed SLOs
is a basic requirement. In addition, service clients base the reputations of,
and their trust in, service providers largely on the supported monitoring infras-
tructure. In the context of SLAs three types of monitoring infrastructures can
be distinguished: a trusted third party (TTP); a trusted module at the service
provider; and a module on the client site. In most typical situations a TTP
module provides all the necessary functionality for a monitoring service.
One of the main issues that the provider and the consumer will have to
agree during the SLA negotiation is the penalty scheme. It is also necessary to
define what constitutes a violation. Depending on the importance of the vio-
lated SLO and/or the consequences of the violation, the provider in breach may
avoid dispatch or obtain a diminished monetary sanction from the client. As
both the service provider and the client are ultimately businesses (rather than
consumers), they are free to decide what kind of sanctions they will associate
to the various types of SLA breaches, in accordance with the importance of
the SLO that was not fulfilled. According to the Principles of European Con-
tract Law [3], the term ‘unfulfilment’ is to be interpreted as comprising: (1)
defective performance (parameter monitored at lower level ); (2) late perfor-
mance (service provided at the appropriate level but with unjustified delays);
(3) no performance (service not provided at all). Based on these descriptions
we define the following broad categories:
‘All-or-nothing’ provisioning: provisioning of a service meets all the
SLOs – that is, all of the SLO constraints must be satisfied for a success-
ful delivery of a service;
‘Partial’ provisioning: provisioning of a service meets some of the SLOs
– that is, some of the SLO constraints must be satisfied for a successful
delivery of a service;
‘Weighted Partial’ provisioning: provision of a service meets SLOs that
have a weighting greater than a threshold (identified by the client).
Monitoring can be used to detect whether an SLA has been violated. Typically
such violations result in a complete failure – making SLA violations an ‘all-or-
nothing’ process. In such an event a completely new SLA needs to be negoti-
ated, possibly with another service provider, which requires additional effort on
both the client and the service provider. Based on this all-or-nothing approach,
it is necessary for the provider to satisfy all of the SLOs. This equates to a con-
junction of SLO terms. An SLA may contain several SLOs, where some (for
example, at least two CPUs) may be more important than others (for example,
more then 100 MB hard disk space). During the SLA negotiation phase, the
importance of the different SLOs for the client must be established. Clients
(and service providers) can then react differently according to the importance
of the violated SLO. In the WS-Agreement specification [1], the importance of
particular terms is captured through the use of a ‘Business Value’. Weighted
metrics can also be used to ensure a flexible and fair sanctionatory mechanism
in case an SLA violation occurs. Thus, instead of terminating the SLA alto-
gether it might be possible to renegotiate, for example, with the same service
provider, the part of the SLA that is violated. Again, the more important the
violated SLO, the more difficult it will be to renegotiate (part of) the SLA.
3. Penalties
The use of penalty clauses in SLAs leads to two concerns: what types of
penalty clauses can be used; and how, if at all, can these be included in SLAs.
The ‘burden of proof’ and the interest in demonstrating that the agreed SLOs
have been violated lie with the main beneficiary of the service, that is, in the
service client. An important issue that should be considered when design-
ing ‘penalty schemes’ is that behind the imposition of any contractual sanc-
tions lies the idea that faulty behaviour of a provider should be deterred. As
such, it is always possible for the service provider to contest its liability in
the unwanted result (SLA breach) and claim that a ‘force majeure’ situation
occurred. Although the situation is impossible to be dealt with through au-
tomatic enforcement, monitoring the message exchanges among the provider
and the client can indicate whether the SLA violation was the consequence of
a ‘misconduct’ from the provider (either intentional or negligent). The parties
are advised to stipulate either in the SLA or in the associated Collaboration
Agreement how they choose to deal with the situation where the provider’s
faulty behaviour cannot be documented, and a ‘force majeure’ situation did
occur. A penalty clause in an SLA may consist of the following:
a decrease in the agreed payment for using the service, that is, a direct
financial sanction;
a reduction in price to the consumer, along with additional compensation
for any subsequent interaction;
a reduction in the future usage of the provider’s service by the consumer;
a decrease in the reputation of the provider – and subsequent propagation
of this value to other clients.
During the negotiation phase, client and provider can agree on a direct finan-
cial sanction. Usually, the amount to be paid depends on the value of the loss
suffered by the client through the violation (that should be covered entirely)
and if agreed, a fix sum of money that has to be paid as ‘fine’ for the unwanted
behaviour. Due to the potential difficulties in proving and documenting the
financial value of the loss, during the negotiation phase the parties may choose
an ‘agreed payment for non performance’, that is, a fixed sum of money that
will have to be paid upon non-performance, regardless of the fact that no fi-
nancial loss was suffered by the client. The service provider can deposit the
negotiated fine in escrow with a TTP, who acts as a mediator, before the ser-
vice provision commences. Escrow is a bond, deed, deposit, etc., kept in the
custody of a third party, taking effect, or made available, only when a specified
condition has been fulfilled1. On successful completion of the service provi-
sion (based on the SLA) the TTP returns the deposit to the service provider.
Otherwise, the client receives the deposit as compensation for the SLA viola-
tion. Notice that a trusted monitor is required for this, as a client can never
prove by itself that an SLA was (partially) violated. For automated use, a
micro-payment [7] system is required – such as Paypal. Another possibility is
that a client reduces its usage of services from a provider that violated an SLA.
If the economic position of the client is strong enough, this can be a valid strat-
egy. A third kind of penalty clause can lead to a change in the reputation of
a provider [9, 12]. In such a system the reputation of service providers that
violate SLAs will drop. In this case special care needs to be taken that the rep-
utation of a service provider is correctly determined. Both reputation building,
using dummy clients that ‘praise’ a service provider, and slandering reputa-
tions, where dummy clients (unjustly) complain about a service provider, form
serious threats in reputation based systems. In the negotiation phase of the
1from Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Revised 10 Edition.
SLA, both service provider and client can agree on the reputation mechanism
to use.
4. Resource Sharing Use Case
Consider a market of computational service providers, where each provider
may use a combination of resources to meet a particular set of metrics of inter-
est to a client. In a service market, the parameters of interest may be of three
types: latency (time it takes to get a result back from the provider), execution
time (total time it takes to execute a service at the provider), and execution cost
(the monetary value associated with running a service by the provider). The
resources (R) that may be used by the provider are defined as a four tuple –
consisting of: number of CPUs (C), primary memory (M), disk storage (D),
and time interval (δt) – δt represents the interval between the start time and
the end time over which the resource is available. A resource provider is re-
quired to define their capacity using these four parameters. Generally a client
does not care what resources are used, as long as their application performance
constraints are met. Conversely, a service provider needs to identify which re-
sources need to be used to achieve these metrics. Two types of SLAs co-exist in
this scenario – an SLA between an application client and the service provider,
and an SLA between a service provider and one or more resource owners. In
this example we use only four parameters to characterise access to a resource –
however this model can be expanded to include additional attributes that have
been specified within the Common Information Model (CIM) [6]from DMTF.
The SLA between the service provider and the resource owner may be de-
fined using the terms: (C,M,D, δt) = R – and may be offered by a single
provider, or it may be the aggregate capability of a group of providers. Prop-
erties of each Ri are published in a registry service—the resource owner being
responsible for updating these values in the registry. The registry may also
contain an aggregate resource description, describing the combined capabil-
ity of multiple providers. After having discovered a provider to interact with,
a client asks the provider for an SLA template. The template contains those
parameters that the provider understands and can monitor. Depending on the
type of description scheme being used, the client now adds constraints asso-
ciated with parameters that have been identified in the SLA. This ‘offer’ is
now sent to the provider—who may either agree with the request, or make a
counter offer. A negotiation process is initiated, which eventually results in ei-
ther an agreement or a failure. An example of an SLA in this context would be:
SLA1 = (2, 512MB, 2GB, (20071001190000), (20071001191000))— indi-
cating a request for a resource with 2 CPUs, 512MB of RAM, 2GB of disk on
October 1, 2007 from 19:00 to 19:10. Such a scenario also occurs in many data
centre applications today [13].
The SLA between the client and the service provider is often harder to spec-
ify, as it can contain application specific terms as SLOs. As outlined in [5],
given an SLO of ‘average response time’ to be less than 10 seconds, the con-
figuration with CPU assignment of 20% fails to meet the SLO, but a CPU
assignment of 90% meets the SLO but the system is over-provisioned (as only
50% is needed to meet the SLO). Therefore, identifying the types of provi-
sioning that is needed to ensure that the SLO is not violated, but that excessive
resources are not used to address a particular SLO requirement is important.
A mapping is needed between the requirements identified in an SLA between
a client and a service provider, and one between a service provider and a re-
source.
It is necessary when specifying an SLO to also specify the penalty that
would be incurred by a provider if the SLO was not met. Often a gradual
structure of penalties is defined, whereby SLO violations incur fines, and a
certain number of violations within a particular time period (such as a week or
a month), gives a client the right to terminate access to the service. A penalty
identifies the compensation that would be made to a service client if the SLO
has been violated. Examples of penalty clauses that may be associated with an
SLA between a service provider and a resource owner may be as follows [2]:
If 90% of the number of requested CPUs, and 90% of requested mem-
ory have been delivered, then these SLOs have not been violated. For
provisioning below 90% of CPU and memory, and for each percent, the
provider must incur a penalty of α monetary units.
If 90% of the number of requested CPUs and 90% of the requested RAM
and 80% of the requested disk have not been delivered, then for each
deviation from 90% (for CPU and RAM) and 80% for disk, the penalty
to the provider is β monetary units.
For an SLA between a client and a service provider, a service execution time
may be used as the SLO, then the penalty clause would be written as:
If 90% of the execution times are not in the 2 second range, then for
each deviation from the 98% of between 2 and 5 seconds, the penalty
to the provider is β monetary units, and for each percent of the 98%
of execution times more than 5 seconds, the penalty is γ, and for other
percents that are more than 5 seconds, the penalty is α monetary units.
A service provider must evaluate the penalty it would incur from the client if a
resource owner was not able to achieve their SLOs.
5. Mapping to WS-Agreement
The WS-Agreement specification [1] provides an XML schema to represent
the top-level structure of an agreement between two parties. This includes con-
cepts such as an agreement identifier, guarantee terms in an agreement etc. A
simple protocol is provided which allows offers, acceptance and rejection of an
agreement to also be captured. An ‘Agreement Factory’ is used as an interface
to create a new instance of an agreement, with the use of ‘creation constraints’
as an optional description of the types of agreements that a provider is willing
to accept. An important factor in this discussion is the use of the ‘Business
Value’ (BV) and ‘Preference’ specification made available in WS-Agreement.
A BV allows a provider to assess the importance of a given SLO to a client.
Similarly, a provider may indicate to a client the confidence that a provider
has in meeting a particular SLO. Based on the specification, a BV may be ex-
pressed using a penalty or reward type. The penalty is used to indicate the
likely compensation that will be required of a provider if the SLO with which
the penalty is associated is not met. We may weigh the importance of an SLO
with reference to other SLOs that constitute an agreement. Notice that a BV
list consists of both a penalty and a reward – to enable a provider to assess the
risk/benefit of violating a particular SLO. Preference is used in the BV list
to provide a more detailed sub-division of a business value for different alter-
natives that may exist. Essentially, Preference allows a service provider to
consider different possible alternatives for reaching the same overall SLO re-
quirement. For instance, in the example of section 4, if a client requests access
to a particular number of CPUs, it is possible to fulfil this requirement based on
CPUs from one or more resource owners. Preference allows the provider to
chose between the available options to improve its own revenue or meet other
constraints that it has (provided this is not prohibited by the service provision
agreement or other agreements between the parties involved).
A Penalty in WS-Agreement may be associated with one or more SLOs,
and occurs when these SLO(s) are violated. According to the WS-Agreement
specification, assessment of a violation needs to be monitored over an
AssessmentInterval – which is defined either as a time interval or some
integer count. Essentially, this means that a penalty can only be imposed if an
SLO is violated within a particular time window, or if a certain number of ser-
vice requests/accesses fail. ValueUnit identifies the type of penalty – in this
case a monetary value – that must be incurred by the service provider if the
violation occurs. In the current WS-Agreement specification, the concept of
a ValueExpr is vague – being an integer, float or a ‘user defined expression’.
This implies that a user and provider may determine a dynamic formula that
dictates the penalty amount depending on the particular context in which the
WS-Agreement is being used.
<wsag:Penalty>
<wsag:AssesmentInterval>
<wsag:TimeInterval>xs:duration</wsag:TimeInterval> |
<wsag:Count>xs:positiveInteger</wsag:Count>
</wsag:AssesmentInterval>
<wsag:ValueUnit>xs:string</wsag:ValueUnit>
<wsag:ValueExpr>xs:any</wsag:ValueExpr>
</wsag:Penalty>
In WS-Agreement the ability to also specify a Reward, in addition to a penalty,
provides an incentive mechanism for a provider to meet the SLO. Based on the
example in Section 4, a penalty clause for the SLA between the client and the
service provider would be as indicated below – specifying that four incorrect
invocations of a service would lead to a penalty of $500.
<wsag:AssesmentInterval>
<wsag:Count>4</wsag:Count>
</wsag:AssesmentInterval>
<wsag:ValueUnit>US Dollar</wsag:ValueUnit>
<wsag:ValueExpr>500</wsag:ValueExpr>
The extent to which terms and conditions specified in WS-Agreements are
legally binding is currently the subject of research [4]. One basic element is
that agreements need to be confirmed by both parties. As such, penalties in
a WS-Agreement, for example, cannot be one-sided. The WS-Agreements
needs to be confirmed by the client. The lack of this confirmation makes
WS-Agreement restricted in the context of legal perspective, as explored by
Mobach et al. [11].
6. Discussion & Conclusions
The use of penalties in SLAs has obvious benefits for both clients and ser-
vice providers. Monetary sanctions and reputation-based mechanisms can both
be used as, pre-agreed, penalties. It has been shown how the WS-Agreement
specification can be used to specify penalties and rewards, in the context of a
particular resource sharing scenario.
A particular focus has been discussion of the types of violations that can
occur in SLOs during provisioning. Based on European legal contract law, we
identify three types of violations that may lead to penalties – an ‘all or nothing’,
‘a partial’ or a ‘weighted partial’ violation of a contract. An observation in this
work is that flagging a violations incurs a cost for the client (as well as the
provider). It is therefore in the interest of the client to continue with service
provision, even if some of the SLOs are not being observed fully – a trade-
off discussed in this paper. A key contribution of this work is a model that
demonstrates how a client may provide weighting to certain SLOs over others,
the legal basis on which this model is based (as outlined in Section 3) and
subsequently how this approach can be used alongside WS-Agreement.
Acknowledgements: This research is in part supported by the NLnet Founda-
tion, http://www.nlnet.nl and in part is funded by the nwo token pro-
gram. Part of this work is also supported by the European Commission Future
and Emerging Technologies programme under the IST-2006-027004 “S3MS”
and the IST-FP6-003769 “CATNETS” projects.
References
[1] A. Andrieux, K. Czajkowski, A. Dan, K. Keahey, H. Ludwig, T. Nakata, J. Pruyne,
J. Rofrano, S. Tuecke, and M. Xu. Web Services Agreement Specification (WS-
Agreement). GRAAP Working Group at the Open Grid Forum, September 2006.
[2] ARAD Automatic Real-time Decision-making, 2002. available at:http://www.haifa.
il.ibm.com/projects/software/arad/papers/ARAD-May-2%002.pdf.
[3] M. J. Bonell. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the
Principles of European Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purposes? , 1996.
[4] M. Boonk, F. Brazier, D. de Groot, M. van Stekelenburg, A. Oskamp, and M. Warnier.
Conditions for Access and Use of Legal Document Retrieval Web Services. In Pro-
ceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law
(ICAIL’07). ACM Press, 2007.
[5] Y. Chen, S. Iyer, X. Liu, D. Milojicic, and A. Sahai. SLA Decomposition: Translating
Service Level Objectives to System Level Thresholds. HPL-2007-17, 2007.
[6] DMTF, “Common Information Model". See Web site at:
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim/. Last accessed: June 2007.
[7] R. Hauser, M. Steiner, and M. Waidner. Micro-payments Based on IKP. IBM TJ Watson
Research Center, 1996.
[8] L. Joita, O. F. Rana, P. Chacin, I. Chao, F. Freitag, L. Navarro, and O. Ardaiz. Application
Deployment on Catallactic Grid Middleware. IEEE DS-Online, 7(12), 2006.
[9] S. D. Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser, and H. Garcia-Molina. The eigentrust algorithm for repu-
tation management in p2p networks. In Proc. of the 12th Int. World WideWeb Conference,
Budapest, Hungary, May 20-24 2003. ACM Press.
[10] A. Keller and H. Ludwig. The WSLA Framework: Specifying and Monitoring Service
Level Agreements for Web Services. Journal of Network and Systems Management,
11(1):57–81, 2003.
[11] D. G. A. Mobach, B. J. Overeinder, and F. M. T. Brazier. A WS-Agreement Based
Resource Negotiation Framework for Mobile Agents. Scalable Computing: Practice and
Experience, 7(1):23–36, 2006.
[12] P. Resnick, K. Kuwabara, R. Zeckhauser, and E. Friedman. Reputation systems. Com-
munications of the ACM, 43(12):45–48, 2000.
[13] E. Wustenhoff. Service Level Agreement in the Data Center. Sun Microsystems Profes-
sional Series, April 2002.
